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Abstract—In this work we present hbAVSS, the Honey Badger
of Asynchronous Verifiable Secret Sharing (AVSS) protocols — an
AVSS protocol that guarantees linear amortized communication
overhead even in the worst case tolerating f < n/3 Byzantine
faults. The best prior work can achieve linear overhead only at
a suboptimal resilience level (t < n/4) or by relying on optimism
(falling back to quadratic overhead in case of network asynchrony
or Byzantine faults). Our protocol therefore closes this gap,
showing that linear communication overhead is possible without
these compromises. The main idea behind our protocol is what we
call the encrypt-and-disperse paradigm: by first applying ordinary
public key encryption to the secret shares, we can make use of
highly efficient (but not confidentiality preserving) information
dispersal primitives. We prove our protocol secure under a static
computationally bounded adversary model.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a verifiable secret sharing (VSS) protocol, a dealer shares
a secret among a set of n parties, such that t + 1 honest
parties can reconstruct the secret. VSS forms the basis for
fault tolerant file storage [5], [9], shared databases [2], and
many other applications. It is also an essential component of
secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols, used both for
generating random preprocessing elements and for accepting
secret-shared inputs from untrusted clients.
The verifiability property means that if any party gets their
shares, then every correct party also receives a valid share.
This is essential when VSS is used as input to MPC, since
parties need to assume the shares will be available in order
to make irrevocable actions (such as revealing intermediate
outputs of a computation). The challenge is that a faulty dealer
may provide invalid data to some but not all of the parties.
The main idea behind nearly all VSS protocols, starting from
Feldman et al., [8], is to broadcast a polynomial commitment,
enabling parties to individually validate their shares.
In the case of synchronous VSS, we can simply wait to hear a
confirmation from all n parties, or else abort. The asynchronous
VSS case is more difficult since we must proceed after hearing
from only n− f of the parties, where f is the number of
parties that undergo a Byzantine fault. Since crashed nodes are
indistinguishable from slow nodes, it could be that f of the
ones we waited for are corrupted, hence only n−2 f correct
parties received valid shares.
In order to cope with asynchrony, AVSS protocols typically
distribute shares with additional redundancy, such that parties
TABLE I
AMORTIZED COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD AND RESILIENCE OF AVSS
PROTOCOLS
Protocol Resilience Comm. OverheadTypical Worst
hbAVSS (ours) t < n/3 O(N)
sAVSS [2] t < n/3 O(N) O(N2)
eAVSS [1] t < n/3 O(N2)
AVSS [4] t < n/3 O(N3)
Sh [6] t < n/4 O(N)
who received invalid shares can recover their shares through
interaction with the others. This recovery process either results
in extra communication overhead [4], or else relies on loosened
resilience guarantees [6].
Improvements to AVSS have made use of concise polynomial
commitments based on pairing cryptography [1]. Most notably,
in recent work, Basu et al. [2] present an optimistic AVSS
protocol that achieves linear communication overhead in the
typical case, but in the presence of Byzantine faults or network
asynchrony may fall back to quadratic overhead. The goal of
this paper is to present a protocol that provides linear guarantees
even in the worst case.
Overview of our solution. The main idea behind our ap-
proach is a technique we call encrypt-then-disperse, inspired by
a related application in HoneyBadgerBFT [12]. The secret share
encoding and polynomial commitments are as usual. However,
before transmitting, the secret shares are first encrypted using
public key encryption. Next the encrypted payload is dispersed
using an information dispersal routine, which can guarantee
robustness and efficiency since it does not have to provide
secrecy.
The use of information dispersal guarantees that every honest
node receives some data, even in the asynchronous setting. If
it turns out to be invalid, then it can be used as evidence to
implicate the leader. Once the dealer is determined to be faulty,
we enter a share recovery phase, which ensures every correct
party receives their share. The share recovery phase can be very
efficient too, since it does not need to ensure confidentiality at
all, since it can only be initiated once the dealer is determined
to be faulty. A summary comparison of our results to related
work is given in Table I.
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II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Asynchronous Network Model
Throughout this paper we assume the standard asynchronous
network model. We assume a fixed set of n communicating
parties P1, ...,Pn, as well as a dealer D. We consider a static
Byzantine corruption model. The dealer and up to f < n/3 of
the parties may be corrupted, in which case they are controlled
entirely by the adversary. The parties are connected by pairwise
authenticated channels. Messages between uncorrupted parties
are guaranteed eventually to be delivered, although the order
and timing of delivery of messages is determined by the
adversary. We assume a computationally bounded adversary
that is unable to break cryptographic primitives.
B. Asynchronous Verifiable Secret Sharing
Here we give the security definition for our construction:
Definition 1. (Asynchronous Verifiable Secret Sharing (AVSS))
In an AVSS protocol, the dealer D receives input s ∈ Fp, and
each party Pi receives an output share φ(i) for some degree-t
polynomial φ : Fp→ Fp.
The protocol must satisfy the following properties:
• Correctness: If the dealer D is correct, then all correct
parties eventually output a share φ(i) where φ is a random
polynomial with φ(0) = s.
• Secrecy: If the dealer D is correct, then the adversary learns
no information about φ except for the shares of corrupted
parties.
• Agreement: If any correct party receives output, then there
exists a unique degree-t polynomial φ ′ such that each correct
party Pi eventually outputs φ ′(i).
For simplicity, this definition is written to be specific to
Shamir sharing, though a more generic definition would be
possible [1]. Our agreement property is written to incorporate
the strong commitment property from Backes et al. [1], in which
the secret-shared value must be determined by the time that
the first correct party outputs a share (and cannot be influenced
thereafter by the adversary).
C. Polynomial Commitments
Polynomial commitments are an interface by which a
committer can create a commitment to a polynomial as
well as witnesses to its evaluation at different points, so to
prove that evaluations are correct without revealing the full
polynomial. Polynomial commitments have been implicit in
all cryptographic VSS protocols since Feldman [8], but were
first formalized by Kate et al. [11] We use the scheme from
Kate et al. because it gives commitments that are additively
homomorphic and constant-sized.
Definition 2. (PolyCommit (c.f. [11]) Let (Fp)κ be a family of
finite fields indexed by a security parameter κ (we’ll typically
omit κ and just write Fp). A PolyCommit scheme for Fp
consists of the following algorithms:
Setup(1κ , t) generates system parameters SP to commit to a
polynomial over Fp of degree bound t. Setup is run by a
trusted or distributed authority. SP can also be standardized
for repeated use.
PolyCommit(SP,φ(·)) outputs a commitment C to a polyno-
mial φ(·) for the system parameters SP, and some associated
decommitment information aux.
CreateWitness(SP,φ(·), i,aux) outputs 〈i,φ(i),wi〉, where wi
is a witness for the decommitment information for the
evaluation φ(i) of φ(·) at the index i.
VerifyEval(SP,C, i,φ(i),wi) verifies that φ(i) is indeed the
evaluation at the index i of the polynomial committed in
C. If so, the algorithm outputs accept, otherwise it outputs
reject.
A PolyCommit scheme must satisfy the following properties:
• Correctness: If C,aux ← Commit(SP,φ(·)) and
wi,auxi ← CreateWitness(SP,φ(·), i,aux), then the
correct evaluation of φ(i) is successfully verified by
VerifyEval(SP,C, i,φ(i),wi,auxi).
• Polynomial Binding: If C,aux← Commit(SP,φ(·)), then
except with negligible probability, an adversary can not create
a polynomial φ ′(·) such that VerifyPoly(SP,C,φ(·)′,aux)= 1
if φ(·) 6= φ ′(·).
• Evaluation Binding: If C,aux ← Commit(SP,φ(·)) and
wi,auxi← CreateWitness(SP,φ(·), i,aux) then except with
negligible probability, an adversary can not create an evalua-
tion φ( j), witness w j, and decommitment information aux j
such that VerifyEval(SP,C, i,φ( j),w j,aux j) = 1 if i 6= j.
• Hiding: Given C and wi for any i, an adversary either
– Can only determine φ(·) or φ(i) with negligible probability
given bounded computation (Computational Hiding)
– Can not determine any information about φ(·) or φ(i), even
given unbounded computation (Unconditional Hiding)
We additionally require that the commitments and witnesses
be additively homomorphic. This allows us to create new
commitments and witnesses through interpolation, a property
we rely on in our AVSS construction.
• Additive Homomorphism: Given commitments Ca and Cb
to polynomials φa(·) and φb(·) respectively, there should be
an efficient operation to compute Ca+b, the commitment to
φa(·)+φb(·). Additionally, given wi,a and wi,b, the witnesses
for the evaluations of φa(·) and φb(·) at i respectively, it
should be similarly efficient to compute wi,a+b. Lastly, it
should also be efficient to compute wi+ j,a from wi,a and w j,a.
In this work we use PolyCommitPed from Kate et al. [11],
which provides a constant-sized commitment that achieves
unconditional hiding as well as our desired homomorphic
properties. We also note that PolyCommitPed achieves un-
conditional hiding through the use of a hiding polynomial,
which we notate as aux in this work. As aux is instantiated
as a polynomial over a finite field, it too realizes our desired
property of additive homomorphism.
D. Asynchronous Verifiable Information Dispersal
Our protocol relies on an information dispersal protocol
as defined below. Our definition is for a batch, such that
M messages v1, ...,vM are dispersed at once and can be
individually retrieved.
Definition 3. (Asynchronous Verifiable Information Dispersal
(AVID)) A (t+1,n) AVID scheme AVID for M values is a pair
of protocols (Disperse,Retrieve) that satisfy the following with
high probability:
• Termination: If the dealer D is correct and initiates
Disperse(v1, ...,vM), then every correct party eventually
completes Disperse
• Agreement: If any correct party completes Disperse, all
correct parties eventually complete Disperse.
• Availability: If t+1 correct parties have completed Disperse,
and some correct party initiates Retrieve(i), then the party
eventually reconstructs a message v′i.
• Correctness: After t + 1 correct parties have completed
Disperse, then for each index i ∈ [M] there is a single value
vi such that if a correct party receives v′i from Retrieve(i),
then v′i = vi. Furthermore if the dealer is correct, then vi is
the value input by the dealer.
Hendricks et al. [10] present AVID−FP, an AVID protocol
whose total communication complexity is only O(|v|) in
disperse phase for a sufficiently large batch v >> n, i.e. it
achieves only constant communication overhead.
E. Reliable Broadcast
Reliable broadcast [3] is a primitive that enables a dealer
D to broadcast a message v to every party. Regardless of if
the dealer is correct, if any party receives some output v′
then every party eventually receives v′. Reliable broadcast
is a special case of information dispersal, where each party
simply begins Retrieve immediately after Disperse completes.
In fact, all efficient protocols we know of, such as Cachin and
Tessaro [5] or Duan et al., [7], are built from an AVID protocol.
We therefore skip the definition but use the ReliableBroadcast
syntax in our protocol description as short hand for Disperse
followed by all parties immediately beginning Retrieve.
F. Public Key Encryption
We make use of a semantically secure public key encryption
scheme, (Enc,Dec), such that EncPK(m) produces a ciphertext
encrypted under public key PK, while DecSK(c) decrypts the
message using secret key SK. We assume a PKI, such that
each party Pi already knows SKi. We also assume that each
public key is a function of the secret key, written PK= gSK,
which we make use of by revealing secret key during the dealer
implication phase.
We note that while in our presentation we only consider a
single session with a single dealer, for a practical deployment,
we would want to derive per-session keys from a single long-
term keypair and allow a recipient to present the session key
along with a proof of its correctness, rather than reveal her
secret key (and consequently need to update her key in the
PKI).
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Fig. 1. Illustration of hbAVSS. A batch of secrets s1, ...,sN are encoded
as a degree-(t, t) bivariate polynomial φ(·, ·). Each party Pi’s shares φ(i, ·)
are encrypted, then dispersed. Polynomial commitments to the sharings are
broadcast, enabling parties to validate their shares. If a party Pi detects an
invalid share, they publish their decryption key, enabling the other parties to
confirm the dealer is faulty. Invalid shares are then recovered in two steps:
(R1) each party P j receives valid shares to interpolate one column φ(·, j),
then (R2) each party Pi reconstructs their shares φ(i, ·).
III. THE hbAVSS PROTOCOL
A. Protocol description
At a high level, the hbAVSS protocol consists of the
following steps:
1) Dealer’s phase: the dealer creates Shamir sharings for t+1
secrets and broadcasts t+1 commitments to the polynomials
that encode them. The dealer then encrypts each party’s
shares using their public encryption keys, and disperses the
encrypted payloads.
2) Share validation: each party retrieves their encrypted pay-
load, and then attempts to decrypt and validate their shares
against the polynomial commitments. If sufficiently many
parties successfully receive valid shares, then the shares are
output.
3) Implicating a faulty dealer: if any party finds that the shares
they receive are invalid or fail to decrypt, they reveal their
secret key, enabling the other parties to confirm that the
dealer was faulty.
4) Share recovery: once the dealer is implicated as faulty,
the parties who did receive valid shares distribute them to
enable the remaining parties also to reconstruct their shares.
We now explain these steps in more detail. The protocol
pseudocode is given in Algorithm 1, and the narration below
refers to the schematic illustration in Figure III-A.
1) Sharing and committing: : The protocol shares a batch
of t + 1 inputs at a time, {s1, ...,st+1}. The dealer creates
a degree-t Shamir sharing φ(·,k) for each input such that
φ(0,k) = sk, and each party Pi’s share of sk is φ(i,k). We
visualize this as a matrix, with each party’s shares forming
a row as illustrated in Figure III-A. Later, if share recovery
is needed, we make use of φ(·, ·) as a degree-(t, t) bivariate
polynomial.
Algorithm 1 hbAVSS(D,P1, ...,PN) for dealer D and parties P1, ...,PN
Setup:
1: Each party begins Pi with SKi such that PKi = gSKi
2: The set of all {PK j} j∈[N] are publicly known
3: Set up the polynomial commitment SP← Setup(t)
As dealer D with input (s1, ...,st+1):
// Secret Share Encoding
101: Sample a random degree-(t, t) bivariate polynomial φ(·, ·)
such that each φ(0,k) = sk and φ(i,k) is Pi’s share of sk
// Polynomial Commitment
102: for k ∈ [t+1] do
103: Ck,auxk← PolyCommit(SP,φ(·,k))
104: ReliableBroadcast∗({Ck}k∈[t+1])
// Encrypt and Disperse
105: for each Pi and each k ∈ [t+1] do
106: wi,k← CreateWitnesss(Ck,auxk, i)
107: zi,k← EncPKi(φ(i,k)‖wi,k)
108: Disperse∗({z1,k}k∈[t+1], ...,{zN,k}k∈[t+1])
As receiver Pi:
// Wait for broadcasts
201: Wait to receive {Ck}k∈[t+1]← ReliableBroadcast∗
202: Wait for Disperse∗ to complete
// Decrypt and validate
203: {zi,k}k∈[t+1]← Retrieve(i)
204: for k ∈ [t+1] do
205: φ(i,k)‖wi,k←DecryptSKi(zi,k)
206: if VerifyEval(Ck, i,φ(i,k),wi,k) 6= 1 then
207: sendall (IMPLICATE,SKi,k)
208: if all shares were valid then sendall OK
As receiver Pi (continued)
// Bracha-style agreement
301: On receiving OK from 2t+1 parties,
302: sendall READY
303: On receiving READY from t+1 parties,
304: sendall READY (if haven’t yet)
305: Wait to receive READY from 2t+1 parties,
306: if all shares were valid then
307: output shares {φ(i,k)}k∈[t+1]
// Handling Implication
401: On receiving (IMPLICATE,SK j,k) from some P j,
402: Discard if PK j 6= gSK j
403: {...,z j,k, ...}← Retrieve(k)
404: φ( j,k),w j,k←DecryptSK j (z j,k)
405: Discard if VerifyEval(Ck, j,φ( j,k),w j,k) = 1
406: Otherwise proceed to Share Recovery below
// Share Recovery
501: Interpolate commitments {Ck}k∈[N] from {Ck}k∈[t+1]
502: if we previously received valid shares (line 307) then
503: Interpolate witnesses {wi,k}k∈[N] from {wi,k}k∈[t+1]
504: for each P j do
505: send (R1,φ(i, j),wi, j) to P j
506: On receiving (R1,φ(k, i),wk,i) from t+1 parties such that
VerifyEval(Ci,k,φ(k, i),wk,i) = 1
507: Interpolate φ(·, i)
508: for each P j do
509: send (R2,φ( j, i)) to P j
510: On receiving (R2,φ(i,k)) from at least 2t+1 parties,
511: Robustly interpolate φ(i, ·)
512: output shares {φ(i,k)}k∈[t+1]
∗Note: To avoid clutter, the protocol is written to share a batch of exactly t+1 secret values. To achieve linear communication overhead, the
ReliableBroadcast and Disperse instances should be shared among a batch of several simultaneously executing instances, as explained in
Section III-C.
The dealer then uses PolyCommit to create a commitment
Ck to each sharing φ(·,k). The commitments are then broadcast,
ensuring all the parties can validate their shares consistently.
Next, for each share k and party Pi, the dealer creates an
encrypted payload zi,k, consisting of the shares φ(i,k) and the
polynomial evaluation witness wi,k, encrypted under Pi’s public
key PKi. The dealer then Disperses these encrypted payloads.
With the broadcast and dispersal complete, the dealer’s role in
the protocol is concluded — in fact since information dispersal
itself requires only one message from the dealer, the dealer’s
entire role is just to send messages in the first round.
2) Share Verification: : Each party Pi waits for
ReliableBroadcast and Disperse to complete, and then retrieves
just their payload {zi,k}k∈[t+1]. The party then attempts to
decrypt and validate its shares. If decryption is successful
and all the shares are valid, then Pi signals this by sending
an OK message to the other recipients. The goal of the OK and
READY messages (lines 302-307) is to ensure that if any party
outputs a share, then enough correct parties have shares for
share recovery to succeed if necessary.
3) Implicating a faulty dealer: : If any honest party Pi
receives a share that either fails to decrypt or fails verification,
they reveal their secret key by sending (IMPLICATE,SKi,k),
which other parties can use to repeat the decryption and confirm
that the dealer dispersed invalid data.
4) Share Recovery: After a dealer is implicated as faulty,
the protocol enters a two-step share recovery process, following
the approach of Choudhury et al. [6]. In the first step, parties
wait for t + 1 R1 messages from parties that received valid
shares originally. The R1 can be checked individually by
making use of the homomorphic property of polynomial
commitments and witnesses (Section II-C). Every correct party
P j participates in the second phase of share recovery, by
reconstructing one column of the bivariate polynomial φ(·, j).
The second step is the transpose, where each party recon-
structs the row polynomial corresponding to its shares. Since
all correct parties send an R2 message, even if they did not
originally receive valid shares, we can interpolate through
ordinary robust decoding rather than using the polynomial
commits.
Batching: For simplicity, we have described the protocol
as sharing a batch of exactly t+1 values. However, to reach our
desired amortized complexity goals, we need to run multiple
instances in parallel in order to offset the overhead of Disperse
and ReliableBroadcast. The idea is to run several instances
of hbAVSS such that the Disperse and ReliableBroadcast
protocols are in lockstep, sharing their control messages (i.e.,
the payloads are concatenated across the several instances).
B. Security Analysis of hbAVSS
Theorem 1. The hbAVSS protocol (Algorithm 1) satifies
the requirements of an AVSS protocol (with high proba-
bility) when instantiated with an additively homomorphic
polynomial commitment scheme (Setup,Commit), an AVID
protocol (Disperse,Retrieve), a reliable broadcast protocol
ReliableBroadcast, and a semantically secure public key
encryption scheme (Enc,Dec) with a pre-established PKI such
that each party Pi knows their secret key SKi and the public
keys {PKi = gSKi}i∈[N] are well known.
Proof. Correctness. The correctness property follows easily:
If the dealer D is correct, then ReliableBroadcast and Disperse
complete, so each honest party receives their valid shares and
outputs them through the ordinary case (line 307).
Secrecy. Secrecy also follows easily. The hiding property of the
broadcasted polynomial commitments ensures that they reveal
nothing about the shares. Each party’s shares are encrypted
prior to dispersal, so the computationally-bounded adversary
only obtains the shares that can be decrypted using corrupt
parties’ secret keys. Share recovery reveals more information,
but if the dealer is correct, then any attempts by the adversary
to initiate share recovery will be rejected (line 405).
Agreement. It is easy to check that parties only output
shares that are consistent with the broadcasted polynomial
commitments. The challenge is in showing that if any correct
party outputs a share, then all of them do. In the following,
assume a correct party has output a share, either through
the typical path (line 307) or through share recovery (line
512). In either case, the broadcast and dispersal must have
completed and the party must have received 2t + 1 READY
messages (line 305).
First, notice the READY-amplification in line 304 plays the
same role as in Bracha broadcast:
Claim 1. If any correct party outputs a share, then all correct
parties eventually receive 2t+1 READY messages (line 305).
If any correct party receives 2t +1 READY messages, then at
least t + 1 correct parties must have sent READY messages,
which causes all correct parties to send READY messages.
Next, the following claim ensures that share recovery can
proceed if necessary:
Claim 2. If any correct party outputs a share, then at least
t+1 correct parties receive valid shares.
For READY-amplification to begin, some correct party must
have initially sent READY after receiving 2t +1 OK messages
(line 302), thus t + 1 correct parties must have successfully
received valid shares (line 208).
Because of the availability and agreement properties of
dispersal, every correct party either receives valid shares (and
by then Claim 1 outputs ordinarily) or else receives an invalid
share and initiates share recovery, which by Claim 2 is able to
proceed.
C. Performance Analysis of hbAVSS
We now analyze the performance of hbAVSS, focusing
primarily on communication complexity. Recall that our goal
is to achieve linear amortized communication overhead. Since
one run of this protocol results in t +1 secret shared values,
we have a budget of O(n2) communication complexity to keep
in mind.
We encounter a challenge: the up-front overhead (indepen-
dent of payload size) of the Broadcast and Disperse primitives
is either O(n2 logn) if Merkle tree checksums are used (as
in Cachin and Tessaro [5]) or O(n3) if full cross checksums
are used (as in Hendricks et al. [10]). Hence to obtain linear
overhead, we consider amortizing these costs across at least n
multiple runs executing in parallel, sharing the upkeep.
The broadcast payload consists of t+1 commitments, but
each one is constant size. Since the overhead of broadcast is
O(n), the total communication cost is O(n2). The total size
of the Disperse payload is n(t+1) elements, but the overhead
of dispersal is constant, so the total cost is O(n2). Each party
Retrieves only a block of t +1 elements, thus all n of them.
The Bracha-like OK and READY messages clearly contribute
O(n2).
The share recovery process clearly involves O(n2) total
communication, but only occurs at most once, since it enables
all correct parties to reconstructing their shares at once.
The final challenge is dealing with spurious implications.
In the worst case, each honest party may need to validate up
to t false implications, each of which requires retrieving a
block from the dispersal protocol, thus O(n3) worst case cost
in total. Fortunately, we amortize this in the same way, by
running at least n concurrent instances of the protocol. We
only need to process at most one implication per party across
all the instances. If spurious, further implications are ignored;
if confirmed, initiate share recovery in all instances.
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